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We consider a model of a monopolistic network operator who sequentially oﬀers two-part access charges
to symmetric downstream ﬁrms. We are particularly interested in analyzing an alternative to current reg-
ulatory practice of prescribing access. In particular, we look at the possibility of restraining the input
monopolist’s market power by endowing downstream ﬁrms with a regulatory option: In case they disagree
with the contracts proposed to them, downstream ﬁrms can claim a regulated access price. It turns out
that this form of regulation may prevent foreclosure even though allowing for price discrimination in the
intermediary market. It proves itself more beneﬁcial to welfare than the current practice of prescribing
access prices above marginal cost. Interestingly, even though one expects discrimination against the ﬁrst
mover, non-discriminatory input prices below cost can occur when the monopolist faces the alternative of a
rather strictly cost-oriented regulated access price. Non-discrimination rules will either not become eﬀective
or result in less optimal price levels.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D43, L13, L14, L42
Keywords: price discrimination, vertical contracting, exclusion, regulatory outside option
∗I would like to thank Christian Wey and Pio Baake as well as participants of the Workshop on Industrial
Organization and Antitrust Policy 2007, Berlin, for helpful comments. All remaining errors are mine.
†DIW Berlin and TU Berlin, csalim@diw.de
1 1 Introduction
In telecommunications policy so-called service-based competition is regarded as the ﬁrst step
towards promoting competition. Coordinating diﬀerent modes of market entry has been
found necessary from this point of view. In recent times it gained importance, particularly,
because for services like voice telephony an increasing number of service providers without
their own network has come into existence.1 These require access to the underlying network
in order to go into operation. In Germany as well as in other countries, a large part of this
network is still owned by the formerly state-owned incumbent and monopolist. Therefore,
requesting network access represents a typical bottleneck situation which is named one-way
access problem in the telecommunications literature. Throughout Europe, but also in the
U.S., this situation has been recognised and dealt with by obliging the network owner to
grant access at a prescribed price. We question whether this measurement leads to a socially
desired outcome compared to a situation which allows for a certain degree of price discrimi-
nation. Our particular idea is to examine the impact of levelling the network owner’s ability
to price discriminate through potential regulation. This regulatory intervention would con-
cede a higher ﬂexibility in access pricing to the network provider. Nonetheless, it would not
completely abandon regulatory inﬂuence. It, therefore, represents an alternative to present
regulatory practice of prescribing access prices in telecommunications.2 In line with this,
our interest lies in two-part tariﬀs as these as well as other non-linear pricing schemes are
widely employed for network access charges.3
Formally, we consider an intermediary market with a single upstream supplier and two
downstream ﬁrms. Contracts specifying two-part input prices are agreed on sequentially.
We presume observable contracts so as to induce identical results to a game of simultaneous
agreements with unobservable contracts. Our aim is to analyze static implications for prices
and output under price discrimination and under non-discriminatory rules given the sug-
gested regulatory framework. This setup is close to McAfee and Schwartz (1984) and Marx
and Shaﬀer (2004a, 2004b). Yet, McAfee and Schwartz (1984) and Marx and Shaﬀer (2004a,
2004b) solve their particular game assuming unobservability of contracts in order to investi-
gate the eﬀectiveness of non-discrimination obligations under diﬀerent beliefs. According to
them, the above described setup would induce a discriminatory contract favouring the later
entrant and foreclosing the precedent ﬁrm from the market if the supplier was unconstrained
provided perfect information. Qualitatively, we obtain the same strategic pricing behaviour
as them: The second mover is oﬀered more favourable terms when wholesale agreements
1 An example of service providers would be providers of voice call services, generally known as call-by-
call providers. Note that such service is realised by diﬀerent means, e.g. there is traditional ﬁxed line
voice-service as well as Voice-over-IP. Yet, from a consumer’s perspective, this diﬀerence is oftentimes
not perceived.
2 Strictly speaking, network operators are only asked to make reference cost-oriented oﬀers which are
subject to approval by the respective National Regulatory Authorities.
3 For Europe, see European Commission (2006)
2are reached successively. However, our ﬁnal results diﬀer from these observations as the
supplier is not unconstrained albeit the ability to make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers: As in Katz
(1987) the supplier’s market activities are restricted because downstream ﬁrms may choose
an alternative outside option. While in Katz (1987) this option takes the form of verti-
cal integration, in our model, downstream ﬁrms can always reject the proposed tariﬀ and
choose a mandated linear input price imposed through regulation. In light of this regula-
tory alternative, our model yields more particular results which shift the focus of the access
price discussion to the role of cost and level playing ﬁeld of the input supplier: Surprisingly,
there is a chance that non-discriminatory prices in form of ﬁxed charges only characterise
the equilibrium outcome. It appears in case of a restricted ability to price discriminate
in the upstream industry, strictly speaking, a regulatory outside option close to marginal
cost combined with low marginal production cost. Moreover, foreclosure is more unlikely
to arise with the regulatory constraint than without regulatory intervention. Yet, results
appear to be ambiguous when conceding higher degrees of price discrimination and cost
levels. In such a situation, either an almost monopolised level of downstream competition
or the facilitation of exclusion might occur. As it comes to non-discrimination, McAfee and
Schwartz (1984) ﬁnd that a non-discrimination rule will not become eﬀective when contracts
are speciﬁed in two-part tariﬀs. This is conﬁrmed by Marx and Shaﬀer (2004b) but for the
case where the primary downstream ﬁrm is excluded from the market. They point out that
non-discrimination claims are likely to come into eﬀect then. In terms of welfare, opinions
on the eﬀect of price discrimination diﬀer: While e.g. Katz (1987) and Yoshida (2000)
demonstrate that price discrimination lowers welfare, O’Brien and Shaﬀer (1994) ﬁnd that
input price discrimination always raises welfare.4 Our ﬁndings concerning the eﬀectiveness
of non-discrimination rules comply with McAfee and Schwartz’s (1984) even with varying
notions of non-discrimination: We claim that they do not become eﬀective. Yet, price dis-
crimination turns out to be detrimental to welfare as in Katz (1987) and Yoshida (2000).
Nevertheless and most importantly, a ﬂat ban on price discrimination as much as abandon-
ing regulation completely, implies lower welfare than a situation with price discrimination
as induced in our framework.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic model. Section 3 studies the
equilibrium outcome under constrained price discrimination. Section 4 analyses the impact
of non-discrimination clauses. Section 5 brieﬂy reﬂects on the assumptions made and Section
4 Katz (1987) argues that price discrimination lowers welfare because it involves the distortion of at
least one downstream ﬁrm being assigned a higher price. Yoshida (2000) comes to the same conclusion
concerning welfare. Yet, his reasoning is that price discrimination leads to substantial losses for both
downstream ﬁrms, but is beneﬁcial to consumers and the discriminating upstream monopolist. In
contrast, O’Brien and Shaﬀer (1994) ﬁnd that input price discrimination always raises welfare as it




We consider an intermediary market with a single upstream supplier N and two symmetric
downstream ﬁrms Si with i = 1,2. The supplier provides an input which ﬁrms in the inter-
mediary industry use to produce a homogeneous ﬁnal good. Both S1 and S2 have identical
production functions with constant returns to scale so that one unit of input transforms into
one unit of output.
The supplier produces at constant marginal cost c, restricting our attention to c ∈ (0;1)
to ensure possible activity of the supplier and subsequent ﬁrms in the market.5 Further,
we normalise the downstream ﬁrms’ production costs to zero. Therefore, their actual costs
of producing the ﬁnal good solely encompass their payments to the supplier. The two
downstream ﬁrms sell their output in the same market and compete in quantities. These
quantities are denoted x1 for ﬁrm S1 and x2 for ﬁrm S2. In aggregate, output adds up to
X = x1 + x2 in the ﬁnal goods market. The market price is characterised by the linear
inverse demand P(X) = 1 − X.6 The monopolist supplier and the downstream ﬁrms have
to settle on contracts ﬁxing intermediary prices. These take the form of individual two-part
tariﬀs comprising a ﬁxed fee Fi and a per-unit price ai required to have a non-negative
value.7 The monopolist can make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers. Yet, the supplier’s contracting
power is limited by a regulatory constraint: In case of disagreement between the supplier
and downstream ﬁrms, the respective downstream ﬁrm can claim to acquire input at a pre-
scribed per-unit-access price cr = c + ∆ with 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1 − c, so that cr ≥ c. Requesting
this regulatory alternative will not entail any additional cost for the downstream industry.
Contracting takes place in sequential order and is observable. Service Provider S1 is the
ﬁrst to settle its contract terms with the supplier.
In sum, we consider a three-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, supplier N oﬀers ﬁrm S1 a con-
tract (a1,F1) for the purchase of the input factor. It is a take-it-or-leave-it option which S1
can accept or reject. If S1 rejects it can revert to the regulated contract (cr,0). In the sec-
ond stage, after an agreement with the ﬁrst downstream ﬁrm has been reached, the supplier
likewise makes an oﬀer (a2,F2) to ﬁrm S2. In the third stage, downstream ﬁrms compete in
the product market: Firms which have left the market earn zero. Firms which have stayed
compete over the amount of service each of them can deliver to the ﬁnal consumer and order
5 One could allow for ﬁxed costs of production, but as long as they are sunk they will have no eﬀect on
the upstream supplier’s behaviour. We assume that they are not that high as to tie up the upstream
supplier’s market activity.
6 This demand can be derived from a variant of Bowley’s (1924) utility function considering two un-
diﬀerentiated ﬁnal goods: U(x1,x2) = (x1 + x2) − 1
2
￿
(x1)2 + 2x1x2 + (x2)2
￿
. Actually, our results
should hold for all decreasing inverse demand functions with P ′ < 0 where P(X) is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable considering functional properties, see Vives,X. (1999).
7 I.e. subsidies are not permitted as they induce ineﬃciencies.
4inputs accordingly.
3 Equilibrium under Price Discrimination
We analyse the outcome of the previously described framework where the monopolistic
supplier can price discriminate but his scope of action is limited due to potential price
regulation. Without constraints the monopolistic supplier will have an incentive to foreclose
one of the downstream ﬁrms from the market in order to maintain a vertical monopoly
and its entailing proﬁts.8 The paper is therefore related to the literature on foreclosure
and we refer to Rey and Tirole (2005) as a recent survey in this ﬁeld. In our framework,
exclusion but also other equilibria are possible. The actual outcome varies with changing
price regulation. In the following, we describe the characteristic features of the solutions
distinguishing between non-exclusionary and exclusionary outcomes and then, order results
by the prescribed access price level. The diﬀerent equilibria are speciﬁed by solving the
game backwards.
3.1 Strategic Interaction without Exclusion
Downstream Competition: In the non-exclusionary case, both downstream ﬁrms will
be active in the market. Thus, there is a duopoly in the last stage of the game. As they
compete in Cournot each downstream ﬁrm will choose its output so as to maximise its
proﬁts taking the contract with supplier N as given. Denoting proﬁts from retail sales as
πi = (P − ai)xi, downstream proﬁts can be written as
Πi(xi,xj) = πi − Fi,








The equilibrium output quantities must satisfy the mutual best response property and con-
stitute a Cournot Nash equilibrium. Therefore, reaction functions of the downstream ﬁrms







xi + P − a
∗
i = 0. (1)
This equation displays the standard optimality condition. It says that marginal revenue
has to be equal to actual input cost and implies that both the optimal quantity chosen and
individual downstream proﬁt is strictly decreasing in the input price ai, but increasing with
the rival’s price aj. One can see that P > a∗
i in equilibrium.
8 There is no problem of double marginalisation due to intermediary prices in two-part tariﬀs.
5Contract with second downstream ﬁrm: The supplier proposes a contract (a2,F2)
to downstream ﬁrm S2. Monopolist N will oﬀer contract terms as to maximise its proﬁts.
Here, the ﬁxed charge Fi serves to divide Si’s retail proﬁts between the supplier and Si.
Altogether, upstream proﬁts consist of those from access provision and the additional retail
proﬁts which are extracted from the two downstream ﬁrms with help of the ﬁxed fee.9 Hence,
the proﬁt function writes
ΠN (a1,F1,a2,F2) = (a1 − c)x∗
1 + (a2 − c)x∗
2 + F1 + F2
taking the agreement with the prior downstream ﬁrm as given in this stage of the game. An
optimal per-unit price a∗





2 > 0. (2)
The distinctive feature of the model is that service providers can claim a regulated input
price. As the value of the regulatory option equals V r
2 = π2(a1,cr), the supplier’s oﬀer must
satisfy the participation constraint
π2(a1,a2) − F2 ≥ V r
2 (3)
in order to reach an agreement with downstream ﬁrm S2. It becomes obvious that the
supplier cannot entirely shift proﬁts towards itself due to the regulatory option. Instead,
it has to permit the downstream ﬁrm S2 to gain at least the amount it would obtain by
choosing the regulatory option in order to implement discriminatory pricing. It will aim to
do so because price discrimination raises the supplier’s proﬁt. Condition (3), thus, becomes
binding so that the ﬁxed charge amounts to F2 = π2(a1,a2) − V r
2 .
Contract with ﬁrst downstream ﬁrm: The supplier likewise proposes a tariﬀ (a1,F1)
to S1. Since the agreement is made before conditions for the rivals are set, the optimal
reaction a∗







1 ≥ 0 (4)
to maximise proﬁts and the ﬁxed charge F1 considering the regulatory outside option. As its
value amounts to V r
1 = π1(cr,a∗
2(a1)), the optimal contract must satisfy the participation
constraint
Π1(a1,a∗
2(a1),F1) ≥ V r
1 , (5)
hence, the value of F1 = π1(a1,a∗
2(a1)) − V r
1 . Given conditions (2) and (4) we show in the
Appendix that both corner and interior solutions for the intermediary prices are possible.
We ﬁnd that the regulated price determines whether one or the other will arise. In principal,
we can say:
9 That is a standard ﬁnding for two-part tariﬀs. It is also known that
∂ai
∂Fi < 0, i.e. variable and ﬁxed
charge move the opposite directions.
6Lemma 1.
Equilibrium per-unit wholesale prices for non-exclusionary cases will always be below the
regulatory option, i.e. a∗
i < cr. (The regulatory outside option is never invoked.)
Proof. See Appendix
The reason for intermediary prices below the regulated level is to be found in marginal prof-
its of the downstream ﬁrms ∂Πi
∂ai < 0, and the fact that the regulated price cr amounts to c
or above. In other words, the downstream ﬁrms must be given an incentive to choose the
discriminatory contracts which requires the discriminatory price to be below the mandatory
option.
Let us now examine the interdependency of access prices. For that, we look at the case of
interior solutions ﬁrst:10 With F2 from (3) and the supplier’s maximisation problem in (2),
the optimal access price a2 will be chosen based on the reaction function
∂ΠN
∂a2













For its rival S1
∂ΠN
∂a1





















represents the ﬁrst-order condition for the access price considering F∗
1 from (5) and condition
(4). Note that conditions (1) and (6) have been inserted into the result of ∂ΠN
∂a1 , hence, the
envelope theorem has been applied. As we compare ﬁrst order conditions (6) and (7) and,
furthermore, consider the monotonicity of reaction functions as well as lower bounds on ai,
we ﬁnd:
Lemma 2. Asymmetric per-unit prices for the service providers can arise with ﬁrm S2’s
price lower than S1’s, i.e. a2 ≤ a1. Per-unit access charges are weak strategic complements
in the non-exclusionary case.
Proof. See Appendix





∂a1 in (7). Observing that these terms have a positive sign and the concavity of
supplier N’s proﬁt function in ai shows a2 < a1, see the Appendix for details. Generally,
such pricing behaviour comes with the sequential settlement of contracts representing a
typical commitment problem: Successive contracting enables the supplier to oﬀer S2 a per-
unit-charge a2 lower than a1. Maintaining a relatively high intermediary per-unit-price for
ﬁrm S1 and a rather low for S2 expands the latter’s proﬁts and reduces the former’s. More
precisely, the S2’s proﬁt increase outweighs S1’s loss. Accordingly, the supplier raises the
10 Alternatively, see Vives, X. (1999). Conclusions for corner solutions can be drawn by considering the
monotonicity of reaction functions (input prices) at the transition from corner to interior solutions.
7joint amount of proﬁts it can transfer to itself.11 As for the complementarity of prices it is
essential to understand that by settling on access charges the degree of retail competition is
determined. With an increased price for one of the downstream ﬁrms the supplier is enabled
to augment the rival’s price, too.
3.2 Strategic Interaction with Exclusion
The regulatory charge and the ensuing degree of price discrimination can reach a level which
incurs one downstream ﬁrm’s exclusion, see the Appendix for detailed results . It shows
that exclusion will target S1 as it is the ﬁrm which receives the more unfavourable contract
according to Lemma 2. Both the up- and the downstream industry are monopolised in this
case. Therefore, in the retail stage, the amount of service placed in the product market by
the remaining downstream ﬁrm S2 is characterised by
xE
2 (aE




Prior to this stage, the upstream supplier’s proﬁt consideration adheres to ΠN(a2,F2) =
(a2 − c)xE






given that a1 is set so high that S1 withdraws from market activities. Again, the supplier’s
power to extract downstream rents is limited due to the potential regulatory option. Accord-
ingly, the ﬁxed charge imposed depends on the value of the regulatory option V rE
2 = π2(0,cr)
so that it amounts to
F
E
2 = Π2(0,a2) − V
rE
2 .
Even though at ﬁrst sight a demur, exclusionary price discrimination cannot be undermined
by requesting the regulated access price cr. It is not worthwhile for S1 to claim it as the
level of a∗
1 at which exclusion occurs is below the regulatory price. Details for this result are
given in the next section and the Appendix.
3.3 The Regulated Access Price and Equilibrium Prices
We illustrate the various equilibrium pricing strategies in Table 1. Contracts and ensuing
retail competition change with the production cost level c and associated regulated access
price c+∆. Therefore, one can distinguish between the outcomes by determining threshold
levels ∆(c) of the regulatory price dependent on the actual production cost. We will use
following notation and order for all 0 < ∆(c) < 1−c to specify the equilibrium constellation:
∆′ < ∆′′ < ∆′′′ < ∆′′′′. The same notation applies referring to access prices ai.12
11 This occurrence builds on imperfect downstream competition. It is helpful to look at the case of
identical prices ˆ a2 = ˆ a1 and the changes due to deviation from there.
12 ∆′′′′ is determined due to ∆(c) ∈ (0;1 − c) and ∆(c) ≥ 0.
8a1 a2
0 0 if 0 < ∆ ≤ ∆′(c)
a′′
1 0 if ∆′(c) < ∆ ≤ ∆′′(c)
a′′′
1 a′′′
2 if ∆′′(c) < ∆ ≤ ∆′′′(c)
≥ a′′′′
1 a′′′′
2 if ∆′′′(c) < ∆ < ∆′′′′(c)
Table 1: Equilibrium Wholesale Prices
Considering the concavity of supplier N’s proﬁt function, corner solution ai = 0 becomes an
option in case regulation proposes thresholds below ∆′(c) as an alternative pricing scheme.
Note that both a1 and a2 are monotone increasing functions of ∆(c) limited by zero from
below and by cr from above. Proposition 1 summarises our results:
Proposition 1. The following types of equilibria emerge when price discrimination is fea-
sible:
i. Non-Discriminatory Inclusion: No variable access prices, precisely, a1 = a2 = 0 will
be charged for 0 < ∆ < ∆′. It means that prices are non-discriminatory in this region.
ii. Price discrimination against ﬁrm S1 is the equilibrium strategy for the supplier if
∆′ < ∆ < ∆′′′. It takes the form of
a. Discriminatory Accomodation: For ∆′ < ∆ < ∆′′ the second downstream ﬁrm’s
input price a2 = 0 while the ﬁrst ﬁrm’s input price a1 > 0.
b. Exclusionary Accomodation: Both ﬁrms are charged a variable access price with
a1 > a2 > 0 for ∆′′ < ∆ < ∆′′′. S2’s contract provokes an output quantity
x2 = 1−c
2 which would usually arise in monopoly.
iii. Exclusion: Exclusion of S1 occurs in equilibrium if ∆′′′ < ∆ < ∆′′′′. Access charges
amount to a2 = c while for a1 all a1 ≥ a′′′′
1 constitute Nash equilibria.
The markup on actual cost inducing the above described pricing behaviour shrinks with higher
production cost, so that
d∆(c)
dc < 0 holds.
Proof. See Appendix
Figure 1 illustrates the regions where the diﬀerent contracts arise.
9Figure 1: Equilibrium Regions dependent on cost and statutory markup ∆
The lower the permitted markup ∆ on production cost the lower is a downstream ﬁrm’s
opportunity cost to revert to the regulated access price. We name such a situation stricter
regulation which characterises region I where the tolerated markup range is ∆ < ∆′. The
variable access prices here result to zero and facilitate strong retail competition without
tariﬀ induced advantages.13 We call this outcome ”non-discriminatory inclusion”.
Regulation is attenuated a little in regions IIa and IIb with ∆′ < ∆ < ∆′′′. Price discrim-
ination takes place but does not induce a downstream ﬁrm to exit the market. We ﬁnd
that:
Corollary 1. A higher regulated access price leads to stronger price discrimination.
Proof. See Appendix
In other words, the higher the upper limit on intermediary prices, the harsher is the adopted
price discrimination. Formally, an increasing price diﬀerence a2−a1 turns out to be proﬁtable
for the supplier due to ∂
2Π2
∂a2∂a1 < 0. With this, the marginal loss ∂Π1
∂a1 < 0 from a higher a1
is not aﬀected as much the lower the rival’s input price a2. Likewise, the gain ∂Π2
∂a2 < 0 from
a lower a2 is higher the higher a1.14 Therefore, as soon as a higher regulatory price c + ∆
permits stronger price discrimination, it is carried out. Even though price discrimination on
the access level gives downstream ﬁrm S2 a comparative advantage over ﬁrm S1 it does not
beneﬁt from it in the end: The resulting higher revenues are seized by the supplier via the
ﬁxed fee F2.
13 Contracts would be subsidised if permitted by assumptions.
14 It is helpful to look at the case of identical prices ˆ a2 = ˆ a1 and the changes due to deviation from there.
10Beneath ∆′′ the variable access price a2 of S2 amounts to zero while S1 pays a positive
per-unit-price a1. Thus, both downstream ﬁrms are accomodated whereby S2’s variable
price reaches its lower boundary of zero and S1’s is limited by the upper boundary c +
∆′′. We therefore named this area ”discriminatory accomodation”. Above ∆′′ not only
the price gap but also the level of input prices rises. Quasi-monopolistic behaviour of the
second downstream ﬁrm is induced by the maintained price level: It places as much on
the ﬁnal market as it were a monopolist and its rival is left to the quantity which has
to be admitted due to the regulatory outside option. We name this particular situation
”exclusionary accomodation”. In region III the permitted markup on cost is so high that it
allows exclusion. As a consequence, the initial retailer is forced to exit the market and no
competition takes place at any stage of the vertical chain. The outcome is therefore the same
as if the supplier acted without any regulatory constraints. In contrast to the other results,
this area is not deﬁned by unique equilibrium values but a threshold value a′′′
1 where all
a1 ≥ a′′′
1 constitute possible Nash equilibria. Interestingly, the threshold is not determined
by looking at the border when activity in the ﬁnal market turns to be unproﬁtable for the
ﬁrst downstream ﬁrm given marginal cost pricing of its rival and the usage of a regulatory
price, i.e. condition Π1(c,cr) = 0 as one would assume at ﬁrst hand. Conversely, the
boundary beyond which exclusion occurs is characterized by Π1(a1,a2) = 0 which yields a
lower threshold than the aforementioned would require.15
Corollary 2. Regulation may prevent exclusion. But if rather weak it won’t alter the in-
centive to exclude. Then, a2 = c.
Proof. See Appendix
For the overall level of access prices, we additionally conclude:
Corollary 3. For non-exclusionary outcomes a2 < c for all 0 < ∆(c) < ∆′′′, i.e. the
variable price a2 will always be below cost. In contrast, for variable price a1, there is some
threshold ˜ ∆ ∈ [0;∆′′′] so that a1 < c for all ∆ < ˜ ∆ and a1 > c for all ∆ > ˜ ∆.
Proof. See Appendix
As price discrimination in the given setup leads to predatory pricing by means of the inter-
mediary price a2, this price attains a value below cost. The competitor’s price a1, on the
contrary, is determined by the degree of price discrimination still allowed by regulation. Its
value changes with the intensity of regulation and leads to an access price a1 > c for higher
thresholds of ∆(c).
15 See Lemma 1.
113.4 Equilibrium Welfare in view of Access Price Regulation
Let us now turn to the welfare eﬀects when the announced regulatory markup changes for
a given input supply cost level. Welfare is given by the sum of proﬁts of active parties and
consumer surplus CS. For the non-exclusionary cases it amounts to
W = ΠN + Π1 + Π2 + CS, (8)
while for exclusion it is
W = ΠN + Π2 + CS. (9)
As the pricing behaviour changes with the regulatory announcement welfare outcomes vary.
The detailed results are stated in the Appendix. Looking speciﬁcally at the eﬀect of the
optional regulated price, we ﬁnd:
Proposition 2. Welfare and Access Price Regulation
i. Welfare is maximised for potential regulation close to marginal cost: If ∆′ > 0 that
occurs for 0 < ∆ ≤ ∆′, otherwise this holds for ∆ = 0.
ii. A higher mandatory access price leads to lower welfare if price discrimination occurs
and both downstream ﬁrms are active, i.e. ∂W
∂∆ < 0 for ∆′ < ∆ < ∆′′′.
iii. Exclusion may be most detrimental to welfare.16
Proof. See Appendix
Up to a certain extent of production cost and regulatory markup ∆ welfare tendencies build
on consumer surplus. Consumer surplus, in turn, is higher, the lower retail and intertwined
access prices. This is the case for non-discriminatory inclusion or otherwise equilibria with
no markup on marginal cost. It enforces intermediary prices of zero or at least relatively
low access prices furthering competition downstream and maximising welfare in our frame-
work. For a higher potential regulated access price stronger price discrimination is executed
and access prices are raised simultaneously. This leads to higher retail prices and weak-
ens retail competition. Hence, discriminatory prices will serve the monopolist’s interests,
but decreases downstream ﬁrms’ proﬁts and consumer welfare compared to the outcome for
non-discriminatory inclusion. This is the reason why the welfare function is strictly decreas-
ing in ∆(c) for the areas where both service providers stay active. For certain cost and
regulation levels exclusion is most detrimental to welfare. However, note that the welfare
function displays discontinuity at threshold ∆′′′ due to Π1 > 0 in (8). Consequently, for
certain mandatory prices in the region of exclusionary accomodation welfare is equivalent
to the one in case of exclusion. It is that under lowered retail competition, as is the case
for equilibria in the areas of exclusionary accomodation and exclusion, the gains of both the
16 For some cases exclusionary accomodation and exclusion yields the same level of welfare (but distrib-
ution of beneﬁts is diﬀerent).
12downstream and the upstream industry can contribute signiﬁcantly to welfare. Therefore,
the amount of welfare achieved can be identical in these regions, yet, distribution of surplus
is diﬀerent.17
Comparing welfare of the discriminatory setup to the case of an unconstrained monopo-
list, we ﬁnd that welfare in the two setups correspond in the exclusionary case.18 Given
our previous ﬁndings, we conclude that a certain extent of price discrimination levelled by
the regulatory option is socially more desirable than the case of an unconstrained monopolist.
4 Non-Discrimination Clauses
We analyse whether non-discrimination rules alter market outcomes which occur under price
discrimination. As the term ”non-discriminatory pricing” has diﬀerent legal and economic
interpretations we consider two diﬀerent notions of it. First, we look at a ban of price
discrimination regardless of an optional regulated access price. Second, we examine the
eﬀect of non-discriminatory oﬀers given the above described option of regulation.
4.1 Ban on Price Discrimination
Consider ﬁrst the strictest interpretation which enforces the same tariﬀs for the downstream
industry by completely prohibiting discrimination. That implies both ﬁrm S1 and S2 are
charged the same tariﬀs (a,F) for requesting network access which corresponds to a simul-
taneous setting of contracts. Downstream, this yields the same quantities being oﬀered by
the two downstream ﬁrms in the ﬁnal market complying with condition (1). We denote,
hence, output x1 = x2 = xND. As network access is concerned, proﬁts of the monopolistic
supplier can be written as ΠN = 2 (a−c)xND+2F which are optimised considering (2) and
(3). Optimisation leads to a variable access charges a(c) > c independent of the regulated
price. The actual access prices will maintain a retail price as if the downstream industry was
monopolised. Comparing this outcome to the ones in case of potential regulation, stated in
Proposition 1 and 2, we conclude:
Proposition 3. A ban on price discrimination is socially less desirable than price discrim-
17 The ability to price discriminate will directly have an impact on welfare provided that asymmetric
prices prevail. Then, in line with Corollary 2 and Proposition 3, a wholesale pricing scheme granting
wholesale prices below marginal cost to both downstream ﬁrms leads to higher welfare than a scheme
with prices above marginal cost. Indeed, at least the more competitive downstream ﬁrm can increase
its sold quantity in case of price discrimination to a certain extent as long as its own variable price is
set to zero. Nevertheless, it does not gain from it because the supplier can seize all of the additional
proﬁt through the ﬁxed charge. So, interestingly, the downstream ﬁrm with the higher variable access
charge gains even though its market activities are deterred.
18 Yet, due to the constraint of c + ∆ in the restricted discriminatory regime, the distribution of proﬁts
is diﬀerent.
13ination facing potential regulation.
Proof. See Appendix
When the monopolistic supplier can only charge the same price components to the down-
stream ﬁrms, it cannot engage in rent shifting via predatory pricing and price discrimination.
It will therefore maximise the joint downstream proﬁts it can shift to itself on the intermedi-
ary level with help of the two-part tariﬀ. The equilibrium in this situation provokesaggregate
ﬁnal output which would occur for a monopolised downstream industry by setting interme-
diary variable prices above marginal cost c. It induces the same welfare outcome as in case
of exclusion. Therefore, a ban on price discrimination cannot be more eﬃcient than the
proposed regulated price discrimination.
4.2 Non-Discriminatory Oﬀers
Giving the disadvantaged downstream ﬁrm the possibility to claim the same and seem-
ingly more favourable contract of its rival complies with the legal understanding of non-
discrimination. To investigate the eﬀect of such a rule, we add a recontracting stage to the
previously used setup. Thus, the principal contracting process remains the same as before,
but prior to downstream competition, there is now the possibility of revising contracts: After
the ﬁrst round of tariﬀ agreements, downstream ﬁrms are now able to claim the same con-
ditions as their rival or alternatively, switch to the regulatory option.19 Once recontracting
is completed, downstream competition takes place. It remains to check whether such a rule
might come into eﬀect. For that, the disadvantaged ﬁrm’s proﬁt under price discrimination
has to be compared to the one it could obtain from claiming a non-discriminatory-price or


















1 . In case these conditions hold it would be
worthwile for the underprivileged ﬁrm to claim the non-discriminatory terms. As for the
regulatory option, commitment to existent contracts is given due to condition (5). Addi-
tionally, we can show that S1 would not claim the seemingly more favourable contract terms
of its rival, for a detailed proof see the Appendix: The supplier can commit both parties to
their contracts by employing two-part tariﬀs. This occurs because the higher payable ﬁxed
fee more than oﬀsets the potential gains from a lower variable fee. It exceeds the amount of
proﬁts a retail ﬁrm can make given uniform contracts. This ﬁnding builds on the dependency
of downstream marginal proﬁts on the rival’s access price: The level of the ﬁxed fee was
determined taking into account S2’s low variable price and the comparative advantage over
S1’s tariﬀ. Therefore, the reduction in wholesale charge a∗
1 is worth less to S1 as this tariﬀ is
19 This sequence of stages builds on McAfee and Schwartz (1994).
14already at its rival’s disposal.20 This can be analytically derived by looking at cross-partials
of the respective proﬁts.
Alternatively, one could examine a variation to the case just examined recognising practical
information constraints: Courts and retailers encounter diﬃculties observing discriminatory
behaviour with help of subsidies because they can appear in numerous forms.21 Oﬀering
the same variable price without the neccessity to check on ﬁxed payments therefore denotes
a practical alternative to the stricter legal interpretation of non-discrimination allegiances.
Here also, we compare proﬁts of S1 under price discrimination with proﬁts obtainable when
invoking non-discriminatory terms as foreseen, i.e.
π1(a∗
2,a∗





Proposition 4. Non-discrimination rules which oblige the monopolistic supplier to oﬀer
downstream ﬁrms the same per-unit price will not become eﬀective in a setting of discrimi-
natory two-part tariﬀs. Potential price regulation does not change this result.
Proof. See Appendix
The reason for that and the crucial role two-part tariﬀs play here has already been explained
in 4.2: It does not pay oﬀ for S1 to choose S2’s preferrable marginal price because it comes
with a ﬁxed fee set too high: Claiming it results in a loss for S1. Thus, both for non-
discrimination rules related to the per-unit charge and for rules considering the entire tariﬀ,
the ﬁxed part of the contract is used to maintain the discriminatory agreement. We conclude
that non-discriminatory oﬀers cannot serve to alleviate possible anticompetitive eﬀects of
price discrimination when two-part tariﬀs are employed. Neither will welfare improve by
enforcing equivalent uniform contracts in the downstream industry. Potential regulation
does not aﬀect this result.
5 Discussion
Apart from the regulated access price as an outside option, our results build on the restric-
tion to two-part tariﬀs, the speciﬁcation of linear demand and constant marginal cost of
input supply. We discuss these underlying assumptions to our model to test the robustness
of obtained results. This, actually, could indicate further areas of research.
Two-Part Tariﬀs
When employing two-part tariﬀs on the intermediary level the supplier uses the ﬁxed fee
to extract as much rent as possible from the downstream ﬁrms. In an environment of
20 As a consequence, the two ﬁrms compete more aggressively in the retail market.
21 E.g. under-the-table-payments, rebates or other allowances.
15sequential contracting this leads to a second-mover advantage. As the supplier’s price dis-
crimination ability is, additionally, restrained by the regulatory option this might induce
below cost pricing towards both downstream ﬁrms. If we assumed linear pricing instead,
the ﬁxed charge as an instrument to shift proﬁts would cease to exist. Then, a ”regular”
Stackelberg constellation on the intermediary level would be present with Nash equilibria
(ai,aj) ∈ {ai < c,aj > c} with i  = j and ai  = aj.22 As we would not achieve below cost
pricing for both ﬁrms on the access level, this would feed back into higher retail prices than
in two-part tariﬀs which, ultimately, could decrease welfare. Therefore, the assumption of
two-part tariﬀs is crucial to our results. It maintains the possibility of stronger retail com-
petition and no variable input price.23
Product Diﬀerentiation
In our framework we consider homogenous products. We motivated this assumption observ-
ing an increasing convergence of Telecommunications and Internet services. Such a viewpoint
is congruent with the attitude of European policy to assess demand-side-substitutabilty when
deﬁning market segments.24 The perspective of diﬀerentiated services could be justiﬁed the
same way since there is a great variety of tariﬀ packages and related services in the telecom-
munications, nowadays. We would obtain similar results to what we found if we changed not
only the degree of diﬀerentiation but also the competitive surroundings in the downstream
markets: With diﬀerentiated products and a Bertand duopoly results should equal the ones
obtained in a Cournot duopoly of homogenous products due to standard duality ﬁndings.
In the most extreme case, diﬀerentiation can ”separate” retail markets which is correspond-
ing to two vertically monopolised market segments removing the interdependency eﬀects on
which our results build.
Constant Marginal Cost
Results were demonstrated by the speciﬁc use of a linear demand example and assuming
constant marginal cost upstream. One could imagine a diﬀerent shape of the upstream cost
function considering the requirements of Telecommunications or Internet applications in-
ducing capacity constraints, like online gaming or video streaming. In these circumstances,
convex cost representing growing cost with more requested capacity or likewise a degrada-
tion of quality seem a legitimate concern possibly aﬀecting the shape of the supplier’s proﬁt
function.25 The conditions we used to illustrate our results would indicate ambiguous results
in this case, so that this question is left open for further research.26
22 Calculating the linear demand example, this yields (a1,a2) ∈
￿
cr, 1




4(1 + c + 2cr),cr
￿
.
23 These considerations, evidently, relate to an environment presuming sequential moves and discrimina-
tory pricing. With simultaneous moves, an equivalent result, particularly concerning retail competition,
could be reproduced by imposing uniform pricing below marginal cost.
24 See Article 7 procedures to monitor the implementation of the EU Regulatory framework, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/information society/policy/ecomm/article 7/index en.htm
25 For convex downstream cost, see e.g. Baake, P., Kamecke, U. and Normann, T. (2002).
26 Furthermore, it indicates a possible extension of the framework considering congested networks.
16Innovation Incentives
We paid attention to the relationship between pricing and welfare with exogeneous input
cost examining the implications of price discrimination in the short-run. Yet, policy discus-
sion nowadays is often concerned with appropriate incentives for investment and a balance
between short- and long-run incentives. Therefore, it is worthwhile, broadening the scope of
our setup as to permit possible investments and the question whether innovation and inno-
vation spillovers are induced by it. This suggests an additional investment stage to explore
the link between pricing and potential regulation. Moreover, the innovative eﬀects caused
by stronger market competition have to be re-assessed and speciﬁed.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined how the regulatory threat of prescribing access charges aﬀects dis-
criminatory price setting of a network operator. We showed that for a potentially regulated
access price close to marginal cost, exclusion is omitted and retail competition furthered,
leading to a socially desirable outcome. We found that the possibility of a regulated input
price aﬀects the usage and strength of price discrimination provided that discriminatory
tariﬀs are in two parts. In fact, prescribing access prices above marginal cost proves itself
socially more undesirable than most discriminatory outcomes facing a potential statutory
price. Additionally, we saw that uniform pricing cannot be induced by oﬀering all respective
parties the same menu of tariﬀs by means of a non-discrimination rule. These results imply
that banning price discrimination cannot serve to raise welfare or install stronger competi-
tion. Also, it suggests to re-examine the eﬀects of prescribing price levels for network access.
Most importantly, the results suggest that threatening regulation may be a useful role for
government intervention inducing a socially more desirable outcome than the present regu-
latory approach.
Observing that outcome changes with varying cost brings the cost aspect of access provision
to mind. From this perspective it is noteworthy, that our results not only depend on the
overall cost level but also on the markup on costs conceded by potential regulation. As
recent policy articulates the interest to stimulate investments, this aspect could be further
analysed extending our framework by an additional innovation stage. With that, our short-
run perspective could be complemented by long-run dynamic implications of discrimination
and regulatory intervention. Endogenising cost as well as the question whether increasing
competition raises both investment activities and innovation might be aspects to look into.
It is left for further research.
177 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
Let us ﬁrst show ai < 0. We will make use of a proof by contradiction:
In contrast to Lemma 1, we suppose that there exists at least one a∗
i > cr. Considering this
relationship and the fact that ∂Πi





for i  = j and i,j = {1,2}. Yet, from this it follows that
πi(a∗
i,a∗
j) − Fi < πi(cr,a∗
j)
which contradicts the participation constraints given in (3) and (5). Therefore, a∗
i > c
cannot be a an equilibrium outcome.




Then, for a solution ai = cr in equilibrium
ΠN(cr,aj) > ΠN(cr,aj)
must hold. It does not. Then, ai = c cannot be a solution.
Therefore, no a∗
i ≥ cr exists as a solution to the given problem.
q.e.d
Proof of Lemma 2:
Existence of unique interior solutions: By assuming linear demand and constant returns
to scale, the proﬁt function ΠN becomes continuous and twice diﬀerentiable. Looking at
its second derivative, we ﬁnd that ∂
2ΠN
∂ai < 0 holds. As the set (a1,a2) is compact, we can
conclude on the existence of unique interior solutions with help of Brouwer’s ﬁxed point
theorem.
Asymmetry and strategic complementarity of access prices: To prove Lemma 2 we have
to show a2 < a1. We start out by comparing the reaction functions given in (6) and
(7) characterising interior solutions to the supplier’s maximisation problem. We ﬁnd that




∂a1 in downstream ﬁrm S1’s
reaction function. Given the concavity of the supplier’s proﬁt function ΠN and ∂ΠN
∂ai > 0 we










to conﬁrm a2 < a1. We look at the two components separately and make use of the binding















using the explicit functions π2(a1,a2) inserting equilibrium values from (14) stated further
below on page 20. Referring back to Lemma 1 this yields ∂F2
∂a1 > 0. Alternatively, one can
check ∂π2
∂a2 < 0 and ∂
2π2
∂a2∂a1 < 0 characterised by inserting equilibria given in (1) and likewise
determine the sign of ∂F2
∂a1 with help of Lemma 1.
Referring to the ﬁrst component ∂F1
∂a2
∂a2
∂a1 the same reasoning applies for factor ∂F1
∂a2 , so that
we can assign a positive value. It remains to show that ∂a2
∂a1 > 0. Given the explicit interior
solution a∗
2 = 1
4(−1 + 2a1 + 3c) > 0 by (13) on page 20, we can also conﬁrm a positive sign
for this factor.27
The weaker condition a2 ≤ a1 considers the possibility of corner solutions at the lower
boundary of ai.
q.e.d
Proof of Proposition 1:
To obtain the results stated we have to solve the linear demand example as stated in sections
3.1 and 3.2. We start by restating the downstream ﬁrms’ and the supplier’s proﬁt functions,
Πi(xi,xj) = (P(xi,xj) − ai)xi − Fi
and
ΠN(a1,a2,F1,F2) = (a1 − c)x1 + (a2 − c)x2 + F1 + F2.
Provided that there is no exclusion, the explicit solution to (1) characterising equilibrium




= 1 − 2xi − x∗
j − ai = 0. (10)













(1 + a1 + a2), (12)
depicting the dependency of ﬁnal output and prices on wholesale prices. Note that one can
already state the boundaries of the diﬀerent types of equilibria using (11) and referring to
the assumptions on c and ∆ given on page 4 as
1. 2a2 − 1 < a1 for no exclusion of S2,
2. a1 < 1+a2
2 for no exclusion of S1,
3. 0 < c < 1 ∧ 0 < ∆ < 1 − c for market activity of the supplier
and regulated prices above marginal cost.
27 Alternatively, one could check the sign of
∂a2






(∂a2)2 when assuming strategic complementarity of the access charges.
19Condition (3) on page 6 determines the value of F2 aﬀected by the regulatory constraint
c + ∆. We get explicit solutions by reinserting equilibrium values a∗
2(a1) characterised by













4(−1 + 2a1 + 3c) if a1 > 1
2 − 3
2c










4(1 − c)2 − 1




9(1 + a1)2 − 1









8(1 − 2a1 + c)2 + 1
4(1 − c)2 − 1




3(a1(−2a1 + 1 + c) − 2c) + 1
9(1 + a1)2 − 1
9(1 + a1 − 2c − 2∆)2 + F1 if a1 ≤ 1
2 − 3
2c.
Again, the regulatory constraint as given in (5) determines the ﬁxed charge F1 requiring
equilibrium variable prices of a∗






18(−1 + 15c + 12∆ − 14a1) if a2 > 0
1
9(−1 + 7c + 4∆ − 4a1) if a2 = 0
(15)





4(−1 + 2a1 + 3c) if a1 > 1
2 − 3
2c




By considering the possibility of both interior and corner solutions in the non-exclusionary
case and the boundaries given in 1., 2. and 3. on page 19 we can deﬁne following threshold
levels (upper bounds):28
Threshold ∆ Equilibrium Type
∆′ = 1−7c
4 if c < 1




3 − 3c if c < 2
9
0 if c ≥ 2
9
Type IIa: Discriminatory Accomodation
∆′′′ = 2
3 − 1
3c Type IIb: Exclusionary Accomodation
Following equilibrium results occur for the equilibrium types within these thresholds: Input
contracts for the case of Non-Discriminatory Inclusion (i.) will take values
a′
1 = a′
2 = 0 and






(a − c − ∆)(c + ∆).







For these values proﬁts sum up to
ΠN = −2
9(3c + 4(c2 + ∆2 + 2c∆ − c − ∆),
Π1 = Π2 = 1
9(1 − 2c − 2∆)2.




4(−1 + 7c + 4∆) and F′′
1 = 1
36(−1 + 3c)(−5 + 11c + 3∆)
a′′
2 = 0 and F′′
2 = 1




6(3 − 7c − 4∆) and
x′′
2 = 1
12(3 + 7c + 4∆) and
p′′ = 1
12(3 + 7c + 4∆)
downstream. Then, proﬁts write
ΠN = 1
72(1 − 15c2 − 48∆2 + 2c − 16∆) and
Π1 = 1
9(1 − 2c − 2∆)2 and
Π2 = 1
144(3 + 7c − 4∆)2.
In case of Exclusionary Accomodation (iib.) equilibrium prices add up to
a′′′
1 = 1
14(−1 + 15c + 12∆) and F′′′
1 = − 1
441(11 − 11c − 20∆)(−1 + c − 2∆)
a′′′
2 = 1
7(−2 + 9c + 3∆) and F′′′
2 = 4









14(3 + 11c + 6∆)
in the product market and results in proﬁts
ΠN = 1
63(1 + c2 − 38∆2 − 2c + 46∆ + 106c∆) and
Π1 = π1 = 1
441(5 − 5c − 11∆)2 and








= 1 − 2x2 − a2 = 0








With this optimal reaction, Network supplier N optimises its proﬁt ΠN = (a2 − c)x2 + F2








(1 − c)2 −
1
4
(1 − c − ∆)2,
where again the regulatory outside option again determines the ﬁxed fee and the actual
proﬁts of the supplier. As the supplier solely obtains proﬁts from the ﬁxed charge, the





(1 − c)2 −
1
4
(1 − c − ∆)2





(1 − c − ∆)2.
To verify
d∆(c)









−3 if c < 2
9 < 0
0 if c ≥ 2







dc = −1 < 0
This veriﬁes that thresholds ∆ are decreasing in c within the given value range.
q.e.d
Proof of Corollary 2:
From Lemma 1 and 2 we know that a2 ≤ a1 < c+∆. From the concavity of ΠN or convexity
of Πi in ai we can then directly see that da1
d∆(c) ≥ da2
d∆(c). From standard derivation rule for





22Proof of Corollary 3
To verify the level of per-unit-access prices with respect to c, we look at upper and lower
boundaries of the prices. The proof builds on the fact that both variable prices are strictly
monotone increasing in ∆(c), i.e. dai
d∆(c) > 0, in case of interior solutions.
Calculating yields the lower bound
a2 = lim
∆→∆′′ a2 = 0 and
the upper bound
a2 = lim
∆→∆′′′ a2 = c.
Considering all non-exclusionary outcomes this shows that a2 < c for all 0 < ∆(c) < ∆′′′.
For variable a1 the lower bound is given by
a1 = lim
∆→∆′ a1 = 0 and










d∆(c) > 0 and there are solutions for all ∆(c) in the interval, there exists some threshold
˜ ∆ ∈ [∆′;∆′′′] s.t.
lim
∆→˜ ∆




a1 ≥ c if∆ > ˜ ∆.
q.e.d.
Proof of Corollary 4
See Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
In order to draw conclusions on welfare, we calculate the explicit solutions of the diﬀerent













119c2 − 16∆2 − 258c − 24∆ + 40c∆ + 135
￿





187c2 − 36∆2 − 374c− 36∆ + 36c∆ + 187
￿
.
29 Instead of calculating an explicit result for a1 one could as well make use of Lemma 2 and the fact
that a2 = c to show that a1 > c.
30 We make use of the same notation as for the access prices.





To show that ∂W
∂∆ < 0 for ∆′ < ∆ < ∆′′′ as stated in Proposition 2ii. we look at the ﬁrst













(−1 + c − 2∆) < 0

























2 − 2c + 3) < W
′
in the deﬁned range of values with c < 2





(1 − c2) < W′.
Also in the exclusionary case, the above-made assumption holds.
We can verify Proposition 2iii. by calculating two examples. For the case of c = 0.2 and
∆ = 0.6 welfare sums up to W ′′′ ≈ 0.228 < 0.24 ≈ W ′′′′ which shows that exclusion is not
the least socially optimal outcome. On the contrary, assigning ∆ = 0.3 in this case yields
W ′′′ = 0.275 > 0.24 = W ′′′′. Therefore, for a given cost level c exclusion may be most
detrimental, but is not neccessarily.
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 3:
As before, the game is solved backwards. According to condition (1) or (A1) and considering
uniform variable charges a1 = a2 = a reduced forms of quantites and retail price dependent









24As the only participation constraint given is market activity, the monopolist, succeedingly,
sets the ﬁxed charge F = πi = x2 and the variable charge with respect to the proﬁt function













This yields the equilibrium prices
pND = 1
2(1 + c) and
a = 1
4(1 + 3c).





so that the supplier sells the amount of access which would arise for a vertical monopoly
in aggregate. It remains to show that welfare for this equilibrium outcome is not higher
than welfare for equilibrium outcomes under price discrimination. To do so, we refer to
the welfare function on page 12 and look at welfare changes caused by equilibrium prices
given non-discrimination compared to discrimination in our setup, see page 23. We ﬁnd that
welfare in the case of non-discrimination and in the case of exclusion from the discriminatory
setup correspond, i.e.
W ND = W ′′′′.
Yet, distribution of beneﬁts diﬀers. This becomes obvious by looking at industry proﬁts: As
there is no further constraint than non-discrimination on the input monopolist’s activities,
the ﬁxed charge F servesto extract downstream proﬁts completely. Hence, ΠND
i = 0 ≤ Πi,
i.e. proﬁts under the discriminatory regime are at least as high as proﬁts under a ban on price
discrimination. Supplier N, on the contrary, beneﬁts from the rule obtaining monopolistic
proﬁts ΠND
N = 1
4(1 − c)2. These proﬁts match total industry proﬁts in the discriminatory
regime, i.e. ΠND
N = ΠN + Π2, which further implies ΠND
N > ΠN for positive Π2. Consumer
surplus stays the same in the non-discriminatory and in the discriminatory regime as retail
prices and aggregate quantity coincide.
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 4:
To ﬁnd out whether a non-discriminatory rule would be invoked the prospective proﬁt of
disadvantaged ﬁrm S1 under non-discriminatory conditions are compared to the proﬁt under






corresponding to the conditions given on page 14 and 15. Proving this builds on the following
three preliminaries:
251. Downstream ﬁrms proﬁts are symmetric, i.e. Π1(a1,a2) = Π2(a2,a1).
2. As we know that ∂
2πi
∂ai∂aj < 0, a decrease in the own wholesale price is less valuable the
lower the rival’s wholesale price. It is because lower wholesale terms make the rival
more aggressive on the retail level.
3. The prescribed regulatory tariﬀ is higher than the equilibrium discriminatory fees, i.e.
ai < c + ∆c as found in Lemma 3.1
Rewriting (15) in terms of ﬂow proﬁts and ﬁxed fees and plugging in participation constraints
(3) and (5), we get
π1(a∗
2,a∗














































The last three expressions contradict the assumption of negative cross-partials. Thus, we
can conclude that neither the other party’s wholesale price nor the regulatory option repre-
sent eﬀective options for S1 in case of competition downstream. The same reasoning applies
in case there is no competition downstream.
q.e.d.
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28Errata:
Proof of Lemma 1, p.18:
Let us rst show ai  cr. We will make use of a proof by contradiction:
In contrast to Lemma 1, we suppose that there exists at least one a
i > cr. Considering this
relationship and the fact that @i





for i 6= j and i;j = f1;2g. Yet, from this it follows that
i(a
i;a
j)   Fi < i(cr;a
j)
which contradicts the participation constraints given in (3) and (5). Therefore, a
i > cr
cannot be a an equilibrium outcome.
To see that ai = cr cannot be a solution, we consider the fact that @i
@ai < 0. Therefore, a
prot maximising tari (ai;Fi) will entail components ai < cr and Fi > 0.
We conclude that no a
i  cr exists as a solution to the given problem.
q.e.d
Proof of Lemma 2, bottom of p.18:
(...)Referring back to Lemma 1 this yields @F2




the same reasoning applies for factor @F1
@a2 , so that we can assign a positive value. (...)






(2a1   4a2 + 3c   1):
29